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CARROT OR STICK?: THE BALANCE OF 
VALUES IN QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY 
REFORM 
Steven Nathaniel Zane* 
Abstract: The qualified intermediary program allows foreign financial in-
stitutions to assume certain tax responsibilities ordinarily borne by U.S. 
withholding agents. The purpose of the program is to collect more for-
eign taxpayer information by creating a more direct link between the 
I.R.S. and recipients of foreign income payments. By accepting more re-
sponsibility, qualified intermediaries are provided numerous benefits that 
make business less costly. Nevertheless, the program has recently come 
under attack due to perceived abuse by wealthy U.S. citizens who use the 
system to evade income taxes. In response, the Obama Administration 
proposes numerous changes to the program, intended to strengthen it. 
But these changes fail to appreciate the balance of values at stake in re-
forming the qualified intermediary system. This Note argues that until 
more benign changes are made, the unique jurisdictional dilemma cre-
ated by the U.S. international income tax system should not be solved by 
shifting from a “carrot” to a “stick” approach for foreign intermediaries. 
Introduction 
 A country faces a host of important choices when it decides to col-
lect revenue through taxation.1 The most obvious is the subject to be 
taxed: usually property, income, or consumption.2 The United States 
relies most heavily on income taxation, the largest single source of fed-
eral revenue.3 Additionally, unlike most other countries, the United 
States taxes income primarily based on citizenship rather than resi-
                                                                                                                      
* Steven Zane is a Staff Member for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 See Dep’t of the Treasury, Economics of Taxation, http://www.treas.gov/education/ 
fact-sheets/taxes/economics.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. In fact, the United States relies more heavily on an income tax than most other 
developed countries. See Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status: A 
New Role for Foreign Financial Institutions Under Final U.S. Withholding Regulations, 27 Tax 
Mgm’t Int’l J. 331, 332 (1998) [hereinafter Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I ]. 
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dence.4 Income paid to nonresident aliens from within the United 
States (U.S. source income) is also subject to taxation by the United 
States,5 and special “source rules” determine whether an item of in-
come is U.S. source income.6 If the rules dictate that income is U.S. 
source, the payment will be taxed by the United States even if the re-
cipient is neither a U.S. citizen nor a resident.7 
 To enforce its income tax regime against nonresident aliens with 
U.S. source income, the United States requires tax to be withheld from 
the income payment (or “withholding tax”) along with information 
reporting on the foreign beneficial owner of the income.8 These re-
quirements create a large amount of responsibility for those U.S. enti-
ties making income payments abroad, known as “withholding agents.”9 
In 2000, the United States created a program to reduce the burden for 
withholding agents: the qualified intermediary (QI) program.10 
 The QI program allows foreign financial institutions to enter into 
an agreement with the I.R.S. to assume some or all responsibilities of 
U.S. withholding agents.11 The program’s purpose is to strengthen en-
forcement of the U.S. withholding regime, but it has recently come un-
der attack due to perceived abuse by wealthy U.S. taxpayers who have, 
somewhat ironically, used the system to hide income and thereby evade 
income tax.12 Recent proposals for strengthening the QI program in 
light of these perceived abuses have sparked intense debate among 
commentators in the tax community.13 
 This Note addresses the Obama Administration’s recent proposals 
to strengthen the QI program, with an eye to the program’s original 
purpose. Part I explains the QI program within the context of the U.S. 
income tax system and presents the current problems facing the pro-
gram. Part II focuses on the proposals for strengthening the program in 
light of its perceived failures and discusses the various responses to these 
                                                                                                                      
4 U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corps., International Income Taxation and De-
veloping Countries 7, 9 (1988). In doing so, the United States asserts its tax jurisdiction 
on a world-wide basis. Id. 
5 See id. at 3. 
6 See I.R.C. §§ 861–63 (2009). 
7 See U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corps., supra note 4, at 3. 
8 I.R.C. § 1441(a) (2009); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(a) (as amended in 2003). 
9 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(b)(7), (c)(7) (as amended in 2003). 
10 See Susan S. Morse, Qualified Intermediary or Bust?, 124 Tax Notes 471, 471 (2009). 
11 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 334. 
12 See Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals 41 (2009). 
13 See Morse, supra note 10, at 472–73; Kristen A. Parillo, Obama’s QI Proposals Would 
Burden Foreign Banks, Practitioners Say, 123 Tax Notes 679, 679 (2009). 
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proposals in the international tax community. Part III analyzes the com-
peting values at stake in the debate discussed in Part II. As a result of this 
analysis, Part III suggests a more benign approach to QI reform that 
considers the economic uncertainty regarding the effects of the Admini-
stration’s proposals and questions whether the United States should be 
able to shift costs to foreign institutions when such costs are a direct re-
sult of the United States’ unique jurisdictional decisions. 
I. Background 
  From the United States’ perspective, it is irrelevant that an income 
payment is made outside the United States as long as the payment re-
cipient is a U.S. citizen.14 If income is paid to a nonresident alien rather 
than U.S. citizen, the United States will tax the payment in one of two 
ways depending on whether it is business income or investment in-
come.15 If the income payment is “connected with United States busi-
ness,” then it will be subject to a graduated tax rate as if the taxpayer 
were a U.S. citizen.16 If the income payment is not connected with U.S. 
business, it is generally taxed at a flat rate of 30%.17 In general, then, 
U.S. source income paid to foreign investors is taxed at a flat 30% 
rate.18 This rate may be reduced or eliminated pursuant to a tax treaty 
or an exemption under another section of the Internal Revenue 
Code.19 Further, if the beneficial owner of the income payment—the 
owner of the income for tax purposes20—is in fact a U.S. citizen or resi-
dent rather than a nonresident alien, the 30% withholding tax does not 
apply.21 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Paul R. McDaniel, Hugh J. Ault & James R. Repetti, Introduction to Unit-
ed States International Taxation 35 (5th ed. 2005). 
15 See I.R.C. § 871(a)–(b) (2009). 
16 See id. § 871(b). I.R.C. § 6012 requires foreign persons engaged in U.S. business to 
file a U.S. tax return. Id. § 6012. 
17 See id. § 871(a) (2009). For the list of exceptions, see I.R.C. § 1441(c) (2009). The 
primary income payments subject to the 30% tax are “fixed or determinable annual or 
periodical gains, profits, and income” (FDAP income), including interest payments, divi-
dend payments, and rent payments. See id. § 871(a)(1)(A). 
18 See id. § 871(a)(1)(A). 
19 See, e.g., id. § 871(h) (30% tax rate does not apply to portfolio interest earned by 
nonresident aliens); id. § 871(j) (30% tax rate does not apply to certain gambling win-
nings by nonresident alien persons); id. § 1441(c) (listing twelve exceptions to the general 
30% withholding rate); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–6(a) (as amended in 2003) (withholding tax 
rate may be reduced in accordance with an income tax treaty between the United States 
and the foreign country in which the nonresident alien resides). 
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(c)(6) (as amended in 2003). 
21 See id. § 1.1441–1(b)(1). Income payments made to U.S. citizens abroad are subject 
to backup withholding, and a separate reporting system (form 1099 rather than form 
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 U.S. source income payments to foreign persons thus present a 
unique jurisdictional dilemma.22 Although the United States claims tax 
jurisdiction over all U.S. source income paid abroad, collecting this tax 
requires more than mere assertion of jurisdiction.23 The United States’ 
solution is twofold: (1) to require a 30% withholding tax on foreign 
income payments;24 and (2) to require information reporting on the 
beneficial owner.25 Both these requirements create liability for with-
holding agents, the U.S. entities making income payments abroad.26 
The withholding agent is responsible for gathering information on the 
beneficial owner of the income payment and withholding accordingly.27 
The withholding agent is liable for any tax it is required to withhold.28 
Failure to obtain reliable documentation is no excuse.29 
 A central information gathering function of the withholding agent 
is to determine whether the beneficial owner is a U.S. person or a for-
eign person.30 For foreign persons, the withholding agent must further 
determine whether the income payment is exempt from withholding 
or whether a reduced withholding rate applies.31 In the event a with-
holding agent cannot obtain reliable documentation providing benefi-
cial owner information, a set of complicated legal presumptions ob-
                                                                                                                      
1042) applies. See David M. Neuenhaus, U.S. Tax and Reporting Obligations for Foreign Inter-
mediaries’ Non-U.S. Securities, 37 Tax Notes Int’l 913, 914 (2007). 
22 Cf. Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 332 (stating that “[l]imitations on 
jurisdiction to enforce are the Achilles heel of any system for taxing international in-
come”). 
23 See Thomas D. Greenaway, Worldwide Taxation, Worldwide Enforcement, 54 Tax Notes 
Int’l 759, 759 (2009). A nonresident alien, unlike a nonresident U.S. citizen, is not re-
quired to file an income tax return. See id. at 759–60. 
24 See I.R.C. § 1441(a) (2009). 
25 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(b)(1) to (2) (as amended in 2003). 
26 See id. The withholding agent’s function is literal: it acts as an agent of the I.R.S. by 
withholding tax from income payments it makes abroad. See id. § 1.1441–1(c)(7). 
27 See id. § 1.1441–1(b)(1). 
28 See I.R.C. § 1461. 
29 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(b)(7) (as amended in 2003). Further, any willful failure to 
collect tax or willful attempt to evade tax by a withholding agent will result in penalties 
additional to the liability for the withholding tax. See I.R.C. § 6672 (2009). 
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(d) to (e) (as amended in 2003). This function is central be-
cause a separate withholding system applies to presumed or known U.S. persons who fail 
to identify themselves as such. See Neuenhaus, supra note 21, at 913. 
31 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 333. For example, if the beneficial 
owner of a foreign income payment is in fact a U.S. citizen, the withholding agent must 
obtain reliable documentation to that effect and reduce or eliminate its withholding ac-
cordingly. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–6(b)(1), (d). Similarly, if a nonresident alien is subject 
to a reduced tax rate due to a tax treaty or other exception, the withholding agent must 
obtain reliable documentation to that effect. See id. § 1.1441–6(b). 
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tain.32 Clearly, this information gathering function creates a somewhat 
large burden for U.S. withholding agents.33 Yet the information report-
ing is essential to ensure that U.S. source income payments abroad do 
not evade U.S. tax jurisdiction.34 
 In most cases income payments abroad will not be made directly to 
the beneficial owner of the income but rather to a foreign financial in-
stitution.35 This foreign intermediary accepts the payment on behalf of 
its account holder, whether the beneficial owner or some other inter-
mediary.36 The foreign intermediary must provide a withholding cer-
tificate to the withholding agent through which the intermediary iden-
tifies itself as a foreign person and intermediary with respect to the 
income payment rather than the beneficial owner.37 A foreign inter-
mediary is doubtless in a better position to collect beneficial owner in-
formation than is the U.S. withholding agent.38 Hence, the I.R.S. cre-
ated the QI system in 2000 to encourage foreign intermediaries to 
assume withholding and information reporting responsibilities for U.S. 
withholding agents.39 
 A QI is a foreign intermediary that has entered into an agreement 
with the I.R.S. to assume certain responsibilities normally imposed on 
withholding agents and to submit to external audits to ensure compli-
                                                                                                                      
32 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(b)(3)(v). As a general matter, these presumptions direct 
the withholding agent to treat an income payment to an unknown beneficial owner as if 
made to a U.S. person and to withhold 31% of the payment, called backup withholding. 
See id. § 1.1441–1(b)(3)(i), (iii); David Luntz, What Is Really Wrong with the QI Program and 
How It Should and Should Not Be Fixed, 25 Tax Mgm’t Real Est. J. 43, 43 (2009). 
33 Cf. Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status, Act II: Notice 99–8 
and the Role of a Qualified Intermediary, 28 Tax Mgm’t Int’l J. 259, 269 (1999) [hereinafter 
Morse & Shay, QI Status Act II ] (describing the various requirements and liabilities for 
withholding agents). 
34 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 332; see also Greenaway, supra note 
23, at 759–60 (reasoning that “jurisdiction without information is useless” and that “[t]he 
best tax enforcement tool is the information return”). 
35 See generally Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 333 (describing how in-
termediaries act on behalf of beneficial owners in receiving income payments). 
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(c)(13). 
37 Id. § 1.1441–1(e)(3)(i). If the intermediary attaches a beneficial owner certificate to 
the withholding certificate, the withholding agent can treat income payments to the in-
termediary as being made to a foreign person. Id. § 1.1441–1(e)(1)(ii)(A)(1); see Luntz, 
supra note 32, at 43. If a foreign intermediary does not furnish the withholding agent with 
any beneficial owner information, backup withholding may apply. See Morse, supra note 10, 
at 472. 
38 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, QI Program Provides Some Assurance 
that Taxes on Foreign Investors Are Withheld and Reported, but Can Be Im-
proved 12 (2007); Morse & Shay, QI Status Act II, supra note 33, at 269. 
39 See Morse, supra note 10, at 471. 
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ance with this agreement.40 In exchange for its agreement to become a 
foreign agent of the I.R.S., the intermediary is provided special treat-
ment.41 This treatment includes, most importantly, the ability to submit 
beneficial owner information in an aggregate rather than individual 
owner-by-owner basis.42 Information reporting in so-called “rate pools” 
provides intermediaries with two major benefits.43 First, “rate pools” are 
far more cost-efficient than reporting beneficial owner information on 
an individualized basis, eliminating some of the burden of information 
reporting.44 Second, providing information in the aggregate better pre-
serves client confidentiality compared to information reporting on an 
individualized basis.45 These benefits are intended to provide a “mar-
ket-oriented” incentive to foreign intermediaries to become QIs.46 
From the perspective of the I.R.S., the more foreign intermediaries be-
come QIs, the more beneficial owner information will actually be col-
lected because the foreign intermediary is in the best position to collect 
such information.47 By transforming the role of non-U.S. financial insti-
tutions in the administration and enforcement of the U.S. withholding 
regime, the QI program is intended to improve U.S. enforcement of its 
withholding tax on income payments abroad.48 
 A nonqualified intermediary (NQI) is simply a foreign intermedi-
ary that does not enter into a withholding agreement with the I.R.S.49 
The NQI must still submit an intermediary withholding certificate to 
the withholding agent, but the responsibility for withholding and in-
formation reporting remains solely with the withholding agent.50 Unless 
the foreign intermediary has actual knowledge that a person for whom 
it collects income is a U.S. non-exempt recipient, the NQI is not re-
                                                                                                                      
40 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(e)(5)(i) to (iii) (as amended in 2003). The external audit 
is performed by the intermediary’s “approved auditor,” not by the I.R.S directly. See id. 
§ 1.1441–1(e)(5)(iii)(B). 
41 See id. § 1.1441–1(e)(5)(iii)(B). 
42 See id. § 1.1441–1(e)(5)(iii)(B), (v)(C)(1). 
43 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 334. 
44 Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, Qualified Intermediary Status, Act III: Rev. Proc. 
2000–12’s Final Qualified Intermediary Agreement and Amendments to Final Withholding Rules, 29 
Tax Mgm’t Int’l J. 403, 404 (2000) [hereinafter Morse & Shay, QI Status Act III]; Morse & 
Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 334. 
45 Morse & Shay, QI Status Act II, supra note 33, at 267–68; Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, 
supra note 3, at 334. 
46 Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 331. 
47 See generally Morse & Shay, QI Status Act III, supra note 44; Morse & Shay, QI Status Act 
I, supra note 3, at 334. 
48 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act II, supra note 33, at 260–61. 
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(c)(15) (as amended in 2003). 
50 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 334. 
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quired to disclose any information regarding such persons.51 But be-
cause the NQI has not agreed to assume withholding and reporting re-
sponsibilities, it may not submit beneficial owner information in the ag-
gregate.52 On one hand, this prohibition provides a disincentive to 
foreign intermediaries to remain nonqualified, both in terms of higher 
administration costs and reduced ability to preserve confidentiality for 
clients who desire to claim withholding tax reductions or exemptions.53 
On the other hand, the NQI does not assume the same responsibilities as 
a QI and does not agree to external audits.54 As a result, the liability of an 
NQI is substantially lower than that of a QI.55 Ultimately, the decision to 
become a QI is a complex calculus that is highly context-specific.56 
 Recently, the QI program has come under critical scrutiny.57 Al-
though the QI system successfully enhanced assurance that tax benefits 
are properly provided to nonresident aliens, the majority of U.S. source 
income payments do not travel through the QI system.58 More visibly, 
the system has been subject to abuse.59 The recent United Bank of Swit-
zerland scandal is a prominent example.60 The Swiss bank allegedly ad-
vised U.S. clients to establish non-U.S. companies as account holders in 
QIs, and thus appear as foreign beneficial owners, possibly owed re-
duced withholding rates.61 Consequently, many wealthy U.S. citizens 
successfully exploited the QI system to evade paying their full amount 
of income tax.62 The current administration has proposed several 
changes to the QI program in response to such perceived abuses of the 
system.63 These proposals are designed both to strengthen the with-
                                                                                                                      
51 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(e)(3)(iv)(A) (as amended in 2003). 
52 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 334. 
53 See id. at 339. 
54 Id. at 339–40. 
55 See id. at 340. 
56 See id. at 341. 
57 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 43. 
58 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 38, at 3, 14. Some commentators 
claim that the QI program has been highly successful. See Edward Tanenbaum, In Defense of 
the Qualified Intermediary Program, 37 Tax Mgm’t Int’l J. 220, 221 (2009) (“That the QI 
program has been a success cannot be denied. Thousands upon thousands of financial 
institutions have signed onto the program. More withholding tax revenue has poured into 
the U.S. treasury than ever before.”). 
59 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 43. 
60 See Joseph M. Erwin, The UBS Affair: A QI and “John Doe” Summons, Steuerbetrug, and 
Bankgeheimnis, 38 Tax Mgm’t Int’l J. 487, 487 (2009). 
61 See id. at 488–89. 
62 See Lee A. Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 3: UBS’s Sweet Deal, 53 Tax Notes 
Int’l 849, 852 (2009) [hereinafter Sheppard, UBS’s Sweet Deal ]. 
63 See Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 12, at 41–45. 
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holding and reporting rules under the QI regime and to provide fur-
ther incentives for NQIs to enter into QI agreements with the I.R.S.64 
II. Discussion 
 In response to perceived abuse by wealthy U.S. citizens using the 
QI program to evade U.S. taxes, the Obama Administration has made 
several proposals intended to “ensure that U.S. persons are properly 
paying tax in connection with foreign income and accounts and that 
proper withholding tax applies with respect to foreign persons.”65 The 
Administration’s approach to strengthening the QI program is two-
fold.66 First, increase reporting requirements for QIs to prevent U.S. 
taxpayers from manipulating the system to evade taxes.67 Second, cre-
ate incentives for NQIs to become QIs.68 With more foreign intermedi-
aries acting as QIs, coupled with increased reporting responsibilities, 
the Administration suggests that tax evasion through offshore accounts 
will be significantly reduced, thereby increasing withholding revenue.69 
For present purposes, two of the proposals are especially pertinent.70 
First, the Administration proposes that QIs be required to identify all 
account holders that are U.S. persons, by filing Form 1099’s with re-
spect to all payments to U.S. account holders.71 In addition, the U.S. 
Treasury would be authorized to issue regulations to implement this 
proposal, including the possible requirement that financial institutions 
may only be QIs if all commonly-controlled financial institutions are 
also QIs.72 Second, the Administration proposes to mandate that U.S. 
withholding agents withhold tax from all income payments made to 
NQIs, thereby requiring the underlying beneficial owners to seek a re-
fund if the blanket withholding tax results in over-withholding.73 The 
Administration reasons that this proposal will discourage tax evasion by 
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. at 41. 
65 Id. The Obama Administration’s proposals are not the first of their kind. See, e.g., 
I.R.S. Announcement 2008–98, 2008–44 I.R.B. 1087. Rather, they can be viewed as the 
culmination of a variety of similar proposals, such as those made by the Government Ac-
countability Office in December 2007. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 
38, at 34–35. 
66 See Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 12, at 41. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 41–43. 
71 Id. at 42. 
72 Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 12, at 42. 
73 Id. at 43. Technically, this is limited to FDAP income, such as interest or dividend 
payments. See id. 
2010] The Balance of Values in Qualified Intermediary Reform 365 
incorrect information reporting conducted through NQIs and encour-
age the use of QIs “by requiring withholding of tax on payments made 
through nonqualified intermediaries.”74 
 Although most commentators agree that addressing tax evasion in 
today’s economic climate is especially important, the reactions to the 
Administration’s proposals are varied.75 Indeed, more radical proposals 
would eliminate the program altogether.76 Some commentators argue 
that the QI program was a mistake from the start, a “purely administra-
tive program designed for the comfort of foreign banks.”77 From this 
perspective, the program naively trusts foreign banks to act as the 
I.R.S.’s sole means of information gathering and withholding, and the-
reby facilitates tax evasion, as demonstrated by the United Bank of Swit-
zerland.78 Moreover, such commentators argue, the program does not 
even offer any tangible benefit to the United States because it has not 
significantly increased revenue through withholding.79 Other commen-
tators have implied that the program’s scope, and recent proposals to 
expand this scope, represents the latest form of U.S. imperialism.80 As 
one commentator colorfully puts it, “Obama wants banks everywhere to 
behave as if they were on Main Street, Ohio.”81 From this perspective, a 
program that requires foreign banks to become agents of the U.S. gov-
ernment—such as the QI program—is far more problematic than tax 
evasion.82 Nevertheless, notwithstanding these more radical positions, 
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. 
75 See Banking Secrecy Practices, Wealthy Taxpayers: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Select 
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Stephen 
E. Shay, Partner, Ropes & Gray), 2009 WL 828055, at *3 [hereinafter Shay Testimony]; 
Morse, supra note 10, at 47–73. 
76 See Lee A. Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual Information Sharing, 53 
Tax Notes Int’l 1139, 1144 (2009) [hereinafter Sheppard, Ineffectual Information Sharing]; 
Bronwen Maddox, Why Spy for Taxman, Australian, July 8, 2009, at 4. 
77 Sheppard, Ineffectual Information Sharing, supra note 76, at 1144. 
78 See id.; Lee A. Sheppard, Offshore Investments: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 39 Tax Notes 
Int’l 209, 216 (2005). 
79 Sheppard, Ineffectual Information Sharing, supra note 76, at 1144. Elsewhere Sheppard 
argues that tax treaties and other information agreements are much more effective than 
the QI program because the withholding tax is used more often by the United States as a 
bargaining chip in treaty negotiations rather than as an actual enforcement mechanism. 
Sheppard, UBS’s Sweet Deal, supra note 62, at 852. Thus, the immediate purpose of the U.S. 
withholding regime has never been to collect revenue. See id. 
80 See Maddox, supra note 76. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. 
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most commentators seem to agree that the QI program serves an im-
portant function and that it can, and should, be fixed.83 
 The QI system is designed to improve the U.S. withholding re-
gime, with the goal in mind to attract foreign capital.84 Because elimi-
nating tax evasion through foreign financial accounts is virtually impos-
sible, any controls aimed at deterring tax evasion should not be viewed 
independently of their effects on foreign capital influx.85 Thus, any 
analysis of the proposals must consider the effects on the willingness of 
foreign financial institutions to become QIs.86 The immediate response 
of foreign intermediaries to increased reporting requirements was con-
cern over additional costs.87 Financial institutions must ask themselves 
whether QI status is worth the additional costs associated with identify-
ing and reporting all foreign source income made to their U.S. account 
holders.88 It is entirely possible that many will decide that QI status is 
not worth this price.89 
 Therefore, some argue, the increased reporting requirements ig-
nore adverse efforts borne by the majority of QIs who abide by the pro-
gram.90 Indeed, the requirement’s success in preventing tax evasion 
could be “Pyrrhic” if the resulting program fails to attract foreign finan-
cial institutions who no longer consider the “carrot” of QI status suffi-
ciently appealing to enter the agreement with the I.R.S.91 Given that 
confidentiality is the single greatest attraction of the QI system, some 
suggest it is naive to presume that the adverse effects of the Administra-
                                                                                                                      
83 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *7; see also Banking Secrecy Practices, Wealthy Tax-
payers: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Doug Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice), 2009 WL 828059, at *3 [hereinafter Shulman testimony] (stating that “the QI system 
is critical to facilitating sound tax administration in a global economy”); Banking Secrecy 
Practices, Wealthy Taxpayers: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Peter H. Blessing, Lawyer, 
Shearman & Sterling LLP), 2009 WL 828057, at *15 [hereinafter Blessing testimony] (stat-
ing that the QI program is “well-conceived and plays a key role in the U.S. withholding tax 
regime”). Shay argues that in a world without the QI program it would be much more 
likely for withholding agents to simply treat foreign banks as beneficial owners and fail to 
withhold appropriately, notwithstanding their liability for doing so. See Shay testimony, 
supra note 75, at *7. 
84 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *12. 
85 See Blessing testimony, supra note 83, at *2. 
86 See id. at *15. 
87 See Alyce Nelson, European QI Community Fears Cost of U.S. Proposals, 52 Tax Notes 
Int’l 264, 265 (2008). 
88 Parillo, supra note 13, at 680. 
89 See id. 
90 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 45. 
91 See id. at 49. 
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tion’s proposal will be minimal.92 Furthermore, the documentation re-
quirements are already incredibly complex, and adding to this confu-
sion will make compliance more difficult for honest QIs.93 The informa-
tion reporting requirement therefore seems to punish compliant QIs— 
who must now breach their confidentiality agreements—for the activi-
ties of a few noncompliant QIs such as the United Bank of Switzerland.94 
From this perspective, the increased information reporting requirement 
looks excessive: an uncritical overreaction to a politically “hot topic.”95 
 Others argue that, on the contrary, the increased reporting re-
quirement would not likely discourage foreign financial institutions 
from becoming QIs.96 Proponents of increased information reporting 
do seem to have one ace in the hole: the QI system, as it stands, is easy 
to abuse, and requiring QIs to report all U.S. account holders rather 
than submitting information in the aggregate is one way to decrease tax 
evasion through the program.97 In addition, doing so places the obliga-
tion for reporting “more securely in the internal processes and comput-
ing systems of the gatekeeper closest to the client,” contributing to the 
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. at 44; see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 38, at 11 (find-
ing that “[o]ne of the principal incentives for foreign financial institutions to become QIs 
is their ability to retain the anonymity of their client list”). Confidentiality is a critical com-
ponent of the QI program because disclosure may be prevented by regulations within the 
QIs’ jurisdiction, and QIs do not want to share client information with competing financial 
institutions. Luntz, supra note 32, at 44. 
93 See Ruth Ann Schneider, Qualified Intermediaries: Caught in the Complexity of New U.S. 
Withholding Requirements, Taxes, Dec. 2000, at 18. Indeed, QIs may make honest mistakes 
based on their unfamiliarity with the incredibly complex U.S. tax regime. Luntz, supra note 
32, at 52. The Administration and its supporters seem to presume that any QI that fails to 
comply with its obligations does so intentionally , and further that any complying QI would 
have no problem with increased information reporting. See id. at 48, 52. But both these 
assumptions seem false. See id. 
94 See id. at 48; see also Nelson, supra note 87, at 265 (noting the “potential risk that cli-
ents who have always complied with documentation requirements would bear the cost 
burden of a few U.S. tax evaders, many of whom may not even be clients of the same fi-
nancial institution”). 
95 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 45, 50. Luntz admits that some may view tax evasion as 
possessing social significance that would justify the costs to the QI program. Id. at 50. In 
this view, tax evasion “warps the social fabric” and inefficient solutions such as increased 
information reporting are therefore worthwhile. Id. Ultimately, Luntz concedes, it is a 
question of social values. Id. 
96 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *9. But Shay is aware that “an important ques-
tion is how much burden and risk of liability can be imposed on QIs without causing mate-
rial participants to leave the QI system.” Id. at *8. 
97 See Banking Secrecy Practices, Wealthy Taxpayers: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Select 
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Irwin S. 
Avi-Yonah, Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, Univ. Mich. Law Sch.), 2009 WL 827960, at *7. 
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efficiency and clarity of the information reporting process.98 As a result, 
many commentators have recommended increased reporting.99 
 The reaction to the Administration’s proposal to require blanket 
withholding on nonqualified intermediaries has received less attention 
from those in support of the proposals, perhaps because it seems less 
controversial.100 The Administration’s rationale appears simple enough: 
NQIs do not enter into a special agreement with the U.S. government; 
thus, there is no reason to refrain from full withholding to prevent tax 
evasion.101 Moreover, default withholding rules already apply to NQIs 
who fail to forward detailed beneficial owner documentation to with-
holding agents.102 The Administration’s proposal would simply apply 
these default rules universally, which amounts to no longer trusting 
NQIs to collect beneficial owner information because they do not agree 
to any form of U.S. oversight---such as an external audit.103 
 But some commentators have responded negatively to increasing 
the burden of being an NQI.104 Although this kind of intermediary 
does not agree to be an agent of the I.R.S., it is not thereby relieved of 
all withholding responsibilities.105 And without the ability to aggregate 
accounts, the NQI system is already more “cumbersome and expensive” 
than the QI system.106 Adding to these higher costs is no trivial mat-
ter.107 And what is even more concerning, not all NQIs choose to fore-
go QI status: many simply cannot become QIs because the I.R.S. does 
not approve of their home country’s “know-your-customer” rules for 
identifying beneficial owners.108 Some commentators have expressed 
special concern over extending authority to the Treasury to grant QI 
status conditional upon whether all commonly-controlled financial in-
stitutions are also QIs.109 To these commentators, such a measure would 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Morse, supra note 10, at 472. 
99 See, e.g., id. 
100 Compare the discussion of increased 1099 reporting requirements for QIs with the 
lack of any discussion for strengthening withholding obligations of NQIs in Shay testi-
mony, supra note 75, at *9–11, 23–26. 
101 See Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 12, at 43. 
102 Morse, supra note 10, at 472. 
103 See id. 
104 See Parillo, supra note 13, at 680. 
105 See Marnin J. Michaels et al., Being an NQI in a ‘QI World,’ 22 Tax Notes Int’l 2139, 
2145 (2001). 
106 Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 339. 
107 See id. 
108 Michaels et al., supra note 105, at 2140. These rules are central to the QI program. 
See Morse & Shay,  QI Status Act II, supra note 33, at 262. 
109 Parillo, supra note 13, at 680. 
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force NQIs into QI status when they have no legitimate business reason 
to do so.110 Rather than encouraging foreign intermediaries to become 
QIs through a “carrot” approach, the proposal simply discourages for-
eign intermediaries from remaining NQIs through the “stick” of mak-
ing business more difficult.111 
 Thus, a wide range of positions has been adopted by commenta-
tors in response to the Administration’s proposals for the QI program. 
Irrespective of the merit of these proposals, their very promulgation 
and subsequent debate highlights the important role the program was 
designed to play in the U.S. withholding tax regime.112 
III. Analysis 
 Ultimately, the Administration’s proposals fail to adequately con-
sider the important balance of values in QI reform.113 Until more be-
nign and higher order changes, such as increased U.S. oversight of ex-
ternal audits, are made, the United States should neither increase 
reporting requirements on QIs nor require blanket withholding on 
NQIs.114 Clearly, tax evasion is a serious problem, both economically and 
legally.115 But the simplest solution to tax evasion—eliminating the QI 
program and requiring complete withholding and information report-
ing on all foreign income payments by withholding agents—ignores the 
balance of values at stake and would represent throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater.116 As commentators have indicated, the privacy of 
                                                                                                                      
110 Id. (“Essentially, you’re taking affiliates that did not become QIs because they had 
no reason to be a QI—either because they’re not handling U.S. source payments, they’re 
only doing local banking or foreign-source stuff, and may have only a trickle of U.S. expats 
that they’re dealing with—and making them become a QI.”). 
111 Id. at 487–88. 
112 See generally Morse & Shay, QI Status Act III, supra note 44. 
113 Cf. Luntz, supra note 32, at 45 (implying that earlier similar proposals failed to con-
sider the important balance of values at stake). 
114 See generally id. at 51 (explaining the attractiveness of requiring increased oversight 
by the I.R.S.). 
115 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *3 (“Taking steps to address the so-called tax 
gap, the difference between taxes due and taxes actually collected, is an important ele-
ment of putting our fiscal house in order.”); Shulman testimony, supra note 83, at *1 (“It is 
of paramount importance to our system of voluntary compliance with the tax law that citi-
zens of this country have confidence that the system is fair. We cannot allow an environ-
ment to develop where wealthy individuals can go offshore and avoid paying taxes with 
impunity.”). 
116 Cf. Luntz, supra note 32, at 47 (arguing that “given the uncertainty as to the actual 
losses to the Treasury . . . any proposed changes to the Program should not be dispropor-
tionate in their effects to the problem it is attempting to remedy”); Morse & Shay, QI Status 
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nonresident aliens is an important consideration.117 Even more impor-
tant, at least from the United States’ perspective, is attracting foreign 
capital investment.118 Every step made to reduce tax evasion potentially 
discourages foreign investment and potentially decreases financial pri-
vacy for foreign investors.119 Additionally, the QI program is not, and was 
never intended to be, the primary system for enforcing tax compliance 
outside the United States.120 In assessing QI reform, then, it is necessary 
to keep these various considerations in mind and to appreciate the 
overarching U.S. economic interest when focusing on the relatively mi-
nor problems caused by offshore tax evasion.121 
A. The Balance of Values and the Administration’s Proposals 
 The uncertainty regarding the effects of the Administration’s pro-
posals, in conjunction with the United States’ unique jurisdictional deci-
sions, demonstrate that the proposals do not adequately reflect the bal-
ance of values in QI reform.122 The noneconomic concern with privacy 
may not seem as noteworthy as the economic concern with attracting 
foreign capital.123 Indeed, the effects of increased reporting require-
ments on client confidentiality, along with any negative implications of 
eliminating confidentiality, are highly uncertain.124 Yet if we assume, at a 
minimum, that financial privacy is a value, it is unwise to disregard this 
uncertainty.125 Although the value of financial privacy may not trump 
the value of tax compliance, neither should it be ignored.126 
                                                                                                                      
Act II, supra note 33, at 272 (noting the balance between enforcement objectives and bur-
dens to foreign intermediaries). 
117 Cf. Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries: Should Tax 
Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 579, 623–32 (2004) (discussing the 
importance of privacy claims by nonresident aliens with U.S. bank accounts). 
118 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *12. 
119 Cf. id. at *8 (noting that “an important question is how much burden and risk of li-
ability can be placed on QIs without causing material participants to leave the QI system”). 
120 Id. at *21. 
121 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 47. 
122 Cf. id. at 45. 
123 Cf. Sheppard, Ineffectual Information Sharing, supra note 76, at 1144 (questioning the 
claim to financial privacy and stating facetiously “[h]ow beneficial ownership in the hands 
of the U.S. government or a U.S. bank is supposed to fall into the hands of Columbian 
guerillas is never explained”). 
124 Cf. Blum, supra note 117, at 630–32 (considering the potential impact of increased 
information reporting requirements on the financial privacy of nonresident aliens). 
125 See id. at 648. Ultimately, Blum argues that “the nonresident alien’s claim to secrecy 
is convincing only if the home government is likely to misuse (or allow misuse of) the in-
formation, and not if the home country can insure that the information is used solely to 
enforce the tax obligation of the depositor to his home country.” See id. at 632. For an al-
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 Regardless of the final judgment regarding the value of financial 
privacy, the prospect of discouraging foreign capital investment in the 
United States should not be taken lightly.127 A chief purpose of the QI 
program is, after all, to increase tax compliance while simultaneously 
making investment in the United States more attractive to nonresident 
aliens.128 Especially given the United States’ current economic situa-
tion, attracting foreign investment is a top priority.129 If the proposals 
are likely to discourage foreign investment, this is a major defect.130 
Moreover, any new international tax policy adopted by the United 
States is bound to have unintended economic consequences.131 Due to 
the complex interrelatedness of the global market and all its interac-
tions, it would be irresponsible to pretend that even the short-term ef-
fects of the current proposals can be successfully predicted.132 This does 
not, by any means, necessitate inaction; however, it does serve as a re-
minder that when the United States runs an “experiment” with tax pol-
icy, small steps are more prudent than large transformations.133 
 Furthermore, were it not for the United States’ unique jurisdic-
tional choices, QIs would not be put in the uncomfortable position of 
                                                                                                                      
ternative perspective on the balance of financial privacy and tax compliance, and its impli-
cations for the QI program, see David R. Burton, Financial Privacy and Individual Liberty 22–
23 (Austrian Scholars Conf., Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.mises.org/asc/ 
2003/asc9burton.pdf. 
126 See Blum, supra note 117, at 624–25 (“The more significant concern of a nonresi-
dent depositor is that the IRS will convey [its] information to the tax authority of [its] 
residence country. . . . The [resident’s] government might use this financial information 
about its resident to carry out illegitimate acts such as expropriation or persecution.”). 
127 See Blessing testimony, supra note 83, at *2 (suggesting that attempts to decrease tax 
evasion cannot place “undue burden[s] on the benefits that come with free flows of capital 
across borders”). 
128 See Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 331 (noting that the QI program 
was designed to create a “market-oriented” incentive to comply with the U.S. tax system). 
129 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *12 (reasoning that the United States’ ability to 
tax investment income abroad is constrained by “its interest in attracting foreign capital to 
the United States”). 
130 See Blessing testimony, supra note 83, at *2; Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *12. 
131 See Blessing testimony, supra note 83, at *2. 
132 Cf. Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony & 
Intellectual Due Process, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 353, 405–06 (2003) (explaining the difficulty 
of human prediction in terms of complexity theory); Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, 
The New “Emergence Economics” of Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for Communication 
Policy, 7 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 217, 289 (2009) (arguing that “short-term prediction 
. . . of the economy is inherently impossible”). 
133 Cf. Morse & Shay, QI Status Act I, supra note 3, at 341 (describing the QI program as 
an “experiment in international tax enforcement” and noting the difficulty of predicting 
the effects of making changes to the program). 
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potentially facilitating tax evasion by U.S. citizens.134 In taxing its citi-
zens and residents on a world-wide basis, the United States creates a 
unique situation: in addition to collecting tax on U.S. source income 
paid to foreign persons, the United States collects tax on the income of 
U.S. citizens and residents abroad.135 There are thus two separate re-
gimes for tax withholding at play and two separate information report-
ing systems.136 Both systems are involved in the QI program because the 
original obligations of withholding agents implicate both types of in-
come payment.137 
 If the United States had no interest in determining U.S. citizen-
ship status for foreign account holders (for purposes of 1099 report-
ing), withholding agents—and by implication QIs—would not be re-
quired to identify whether the beneficial owners of income payments 
were U.S. persons.138 From the perspective of cost-shifting, placing the 
burden of 1099 reporting on foreign intermediaries seems dispropor-
tionate.139 Although tax evasion is a serious problem, as long as the 
United States retains its jurisdictional choice to tax citizens on a world-
wide basis, the burden of discovering U.S. account holders should not 
be placed disproportionately on the shoulders of QIs.140 This argument 
does not imply that the program should not be strengthened to en-
force the U.S. withholding regime, but it does reinforce the value of 
taking small steps in QI reform.141 
B. Requiring Increased U.S. Oversight Is a Better First Step 
 In light of the inherent uncertainty regarding the economic and 
noneconomic effects of the host of proposed changes, as well as the 
United States’ unique jurisdictional decisions, the most reasonable first 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Neuenhaus, supra note 21, at 918 (“[A]n intermediary’s obligation to report 
and withhold regarding U.S. payees can be imposed on both U.S.- and non-U.S.-source 
income.”). 
135 See U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corps., supra note 4, at 9; Neuenhaus, supra note 
21, at 914. 
136 Neuenhaus, supra note 21, at 914. The first involves reporting for nonresident 
aliens to whom U.S. source income is paid, called 1042-S reporting. Id. The second in-
volves reporting for presumed U.S. citizens to whom any income is paid, called 1099 re-
porting. Id. 
137 See Shay testimony, supra note 75, at *15–17. 
138 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(b)(5). 
139 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 47. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
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step in QI reform seems to be the one with the least impact.142 The two 
major proposals discussed above are connected by a sense of tightening 
restrictions and punishing noncompliance rather than rewarding com-
pliance: a drastic shift from “carrot” to “stick.”143 As one commentator 
points out, a more benign change to the program would involve the 
United States more directly in the QI external audit requirement, by 
requiring external auditors to “associate” with U.S. auditors.144 Although 
this proposal may not possess the same promise of curbing U.S. tax eva-
sion as a more “integrated” approach, it does represent a less intrusive 
requirement for foreign intermediaries and may help significantly re-
duce honest errors made in the reporting process.145 Moreover, this re-
quirement imposes a change at a higher level in the program than indi-
vidual financial institutions: the involvement of the U.S. government in 
administering the program.146 Because this requirement does not re-
quire much more of an obligation from QIs, individual institutions are 
less likely to perceive it as a burden than the current proposals.147 
Therefore, the association requirement better respects the competing 
values of protecting financial privacy and attracting foreign invest-
ment.148 
 This proposal is championed by many commentators, but it is usu-
ally suggested as part of an “integrated approach” involving many more 
changes—such as increased information reporting—to be made at 
once.149 But such an “integrated approach” is precisely the wrong ap-
proach given the uncertainty surrounding the effects of QI reform.150 
Taking a small step at the level of U.S. oversight of the QI system rather 
than increasing regulations for foreign financial institutions represents 
an initial compromise that better balances the values of attracting for-
eign investment, respecting financial privacy, and curbing tax eva-
sion.151 
                                                                                                                      
142 Cf. id. at 45 (arguing that any attempt at QI reform should “maximize[] the bene-
fits and minimize[] the costs of each affected party”). 
143 See Parillo, supra note 13, at 680. 
144 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 51. 
145 See id. at 51–52. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. at 49, 51. 
148 See id. at 45. 
149 See Shulmam testimony, supra note 83, at *2, 4. 
150 See Blessing testimony, supra note 83, at *2 (noting that “[t]ax measures adopted in 
response to legitimate concerns can have unanticipated and unhappy consequences from 
the standpoint of economic efficiency”). 
151 See Luntz, supra note 32, at 47; Maddox, supra note 76. 
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Conclusion 
 The qualified intermediary program was created as a compromise 
among competing values. In exchange for facilitating U.S. withholding 
tax enforcement, foreign financial institutions would be provided privi-
leges for reporting taxable U.S. income. In light of perceived abuse of 
this program by wealthy U.S. taxpayers, the Obama Administration 
proposes reform that will strengthen reporting requirements and fur-
ther “encourage” nonqualified intermediaries to enter the QI regime. 
Yet these proposals come at a cost, in terms of increasing the burden of 
being a QI, and thus represent a drastic shift from “carrot to stick” in 
the QI program. Although there is disagreement about whether for-
eign financial institutions will in fact be discouraged from entering the 
program, the uncertainty surrounding the proposed changes provides 
ample reason for alarm, especially considering the importance of at-
tracting foreign capital at present economic times. Moreover, the Unit-
ed States’ decision to tax U.S. citizens and residents on a world-wide 
basis—the only developed country to do so—is directly responsible for 
the enhanced responsibilities of U.S. withholding agents and, by impli-
cation, QIs. Given these considerations, a more responsible first step in 
QI reform would be increasing U.S. involvement in the external audit 
procedure already in place, rather than increasing reporting require-
ments for QIs and increasing the burden of remaining an NQI. As long 
as the United States desires to keep the QI program and its unique sys-
tem of international tax jurisdiction, it is necessary to involve compro-
mises the Administration’s proposals fail to make. 
